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FINTECH LENDING: A STUDY OF EXPECTATIONS
VERSUS MARKET OUTCOMES
VINCENT DI LORENZO*
Abstract
This article explores expectations and outcomes. It documents the expectations for the fintech lending industry, which has
emerged in this decade, and compares such expectations to market
outcomes. It presents an evidence-based analysis for policy making
decisions. Part one of the article documents expectations—possible
benefits and risks of fintech lending—through large-scale surveys
and interviews of industry, consumer and government stakeholders.
Part two of the article examines market outcomes—benefits and risks
that have been realized or failed to materialize as documented by
studies of substantial data sets of various types of fintech loans. The
benefits and risks explored include increased access to credit, lower
costs, lack of transparency and delinquency and default. After comparing expectations and outcomes, the article considers policy
implications, particularly the implications for chartering special
purpose national banks.
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Introduction
Fintech lending, sometimes referred to as online marketplace
lending, is lending through digital platforms that often collect and base
lending decisions on nontraditional data sources. Underwriting is
typically automated and may employ nontraditional credit algorithms.
In the consumer and small business credit market, fintech loan
originations have experienced an annual compounding growth rate of
163% between 2011 and 2015.1 It is estimated fintech loan originations (excluding mortgages) could reach $90 billion by 2020, from
approximately $25 billion in 2015.2 In the U.S. personal loan market,
fintech lenders’ market share increased from less than 1% in 2010 to
36% in 2017.3 In the mortgage market, fintech lenders’ market share
increased from 2% in 2010 to 8% in 2016, with total dollar volume of
originations growing 30% annually.4
This article explores the benefits and risks of fintech lending.
It documents expectations and compares them to market outcomes. It
presents an evidence based analysis for later policy making decisions.
Part I of this article explores expectations regarding fintech lending—
possible benefits and risks—and the reason(s) for such expectations.
Part II of this article examines market outcomes to date—the benefits
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University.
1
David W. Perkins, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4464, MARKETPLACE
LENDING: FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 5 (2016)
(based on a report by analysts at Deloitte).
2
AM. BANKERS ASS’N, THE STATE OF DIGITAL LENDING 5 (2018), http://
www.aba.com/Products/Endorsed/Documents/ABADigitalLendingReport.pdf (reporting results of a 2016 report by Autonomous Research,
stating “loan origination volumes could reach $90 billion by 2020 from about
$25 billion in 2015”).
3
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 13 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/AFinancial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---NonbankFinancials-Fintech-and-Innovation_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JY8-FAQA]
[hereinafter Nonbank Financials] (analyzing data from TransUnion).
4
ANDREAS FUSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF, REPORT NO.
836, THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN MORTGAGE LENDING 1 (2018), https://
www newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr836.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CFU-PK5S] (stating that fintech lending has “grown
annually by 30% from $34bn of total originations in 2010 (2% of market) to
$161bn in 2016 (8% of market”)).
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and risks that have been realized or that failed to materialize. After
comparing expectations and market outcomes, the article explores the
policy implications of such outcomes.
I.

Part One: Expectations

Individual opinions of the potential benefits and risks of
fintech lending are not relied upon in this study. Rather, this article
documents expectations through large-scale surveys and interviews of
various stakeholders in the fintech lending market. Three sources
provide information for this study: (i) a survey conducted by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury through a Request for Information (RFI)
in the summer of 2015;5 (ii) interviews conducted by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) from July 2016 to April 2017;6 and (iii)
solicitation of comments on Special Purpose National Bank [SPNB]
Charters for Fintech Companies by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in December 2016 and January 2017.7
The Treasury Department solicited public input through a
series of fourteen questions on, among other things, business models
and products offered by fintech lenders, the potential for such lenders
to expand access to credit to historically underserved market segments,
and the risks arising from data-driven processes relative to those used
in traditional lending.8 They received responses from ninety-four
entities including financial industry members, financial industry
5

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE
MARKETPLACE LENDING (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/
documents/opportunities_and_challenges_in_online_marketplace_lending_w
hite_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ7Y-ARUQ] [hereinafter Treasury

2016] (explaining that the white paper continues the work initiated by
the issuance of a “Request for Information” and establishes an “overview of the evolving market landscape, reviews stakeholder opinions,
and provides policy recommendations).

6

See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-361,
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-361].
7
See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T.
OF THE TREASURY, EXPLORING NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH
COMPANIES
15–16
(2016),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsibleinnovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BS5A-3EG9].
8
Treasury 2016, supra note 5 at 3, 41 app. B (describing this solicitation of
public input and providing the list of 14 questions).
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associations, public interest organizations, and state and local government entities and regulators.9 The Treasury Department also convened
industry stakeholders in Washington, D.C. to discuss a range of topics
including consumer protection, data privacy, capital market issues, and
regulatory concerns.10 The RFI responses and Treasury Department
discussions with stakeholders yielded a number of potential benefits
and risks of fintech lending.
The expected benefits identified were:11
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

lower costs to consumers and small businesses;
quicker turnaround times;
greater convenience; and
expanding access to credit

The survey identified the following potential risks:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

defaults, based on concern that the accuracy of credit risk in
use of new data and credit risk models remain untested;
inaccuracies in new data sources;
fair lending violations, due to disparate impact of use of new
data sources and credit models;
lack of transparency, in bases for underwriting, lending terms,
and information for investors12; and
predatory lending and targeting of vulnerable borrower
segments.13

Congress asked GAO to provide it with information on the
fintech industry, including its structure and development and how
federal regulators supervise fintech firms.14 GAO obtained input on a
number of fintech products and services, including fintech lending.15
Interviews were conducted with staff members of federal government
regulators, associations of state government financial supervisors, and
9

Id. at 42 app. C (listing the entities that provided responses).
Id. at 19.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 20.
14
GAO-17-361, supra note 6, at 1.
15
Id. at 3–9 (discussing, among other topics, fintech lending, trends, and
regulation).
10
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numerous industry trade associations.16 Based on these interviews, as
well as a literature search of publications from agencies, industry
groups and other knowledgeable parties, GAO identified a number of
potential benefits and risks of fintech lending, including the
following:17
i.
ii.
iii.

lower costs;
expanded access to credit to underserved populations; and
faster service.18

Potential risks identified were:
i.
ii.
iii.

lack of transparency in loan terms; making comparison of
lenders difficult;
fair lending violations that may result from use of nontraditional data for underwriting decisions; and
delinquency and default possibilities in the marketplace
lending sector, since little is known as to how the industry’s
loans will perform in other economic conditions such as a
recession.19

The OCC’s Request for Comments on possible SPNB Charters for Fintech Companies sought input on all aspects of the fintech
industry, including input on chartering decisions and requirements.20
The OCC’s Request for Comments led to 110 responses from fintech
companies, financial industry associations, state government regulators, public interest groups, public policy centers, and some members
of Congress.21 This formed the data set for this article. After a review
of such comments, the expected benefits and risks of fintech lending
16

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 6–9 (discussing the potential benefits and risks of fintech lending).
18
Id. at 6–7.
19
The report also identified as a risk the lack of the same legal protections for
small business borrowers as are extended to consumers, but the risk is not
unique to fintech lending. Id. at 8–9.
20
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 7 at 15–16.
21
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL
BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES, http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics
/responsible-innovation/fintech-charter-comments.html (last updated Jan. 27,
2017) [https://perma.cc/U92K-BUYF] [hereinafter OCC Public Comments]
(providing access to all 110 responses to the OCC’s Request for Comments).
17
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were isolated—as opposed to other fintech products and services, or
the benefits and risks of federal versus state regulation of the industry.
The potential benefits of fintech lending stated by the commentators, by decreasing order of frequency, were:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

expanded access to credit;
faster, more convenient processes and access to credit;
lower costs to borrowers;
less systemic risk;
less privacy and data security risk;
less bias in lending decisions; and
better loan portfolio performance.22

The potential risks of fintech lending stated by the commentators, by decreasing order of frequency, were:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

predatory lending and targeting of vulnerable borrowers;
fair lending violations;
lack of transparency;
threats to customer privacy;
delinquency and default risks for both borrowers and lenders;
challenges to the ability of government to effectively regulate;
and
exclusion of unbanked or low-income consumers.23

There was only modest overlap in the parties providing input
in the three surveys. Nonetheless, the benefits and risks identified in
the three surveys were fairly consistent. What were the precise meanings and reasons associated with each expectation? This article
explores such issues, and will assist in analysis of the ability of current
legal initiatives to promote benefits and minimize risks of fintech
lending. In the OCC Public Comments the benefit most frequently
expected from fintech lending was expanded access to credit.24 This
22

See generally id.
Id.
24
Some comments expressed this expected benefit without clearly identifying
the specific reason for the expectation. Letter from Daniel Gorfine, Vice
President, External Affairs & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, On Deck Capital, Inc., to
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017); Letter from
Kevin Foster-Keddie, President & CEO, Wash. State Employees Credit
Union, Bd. Member, QCash Fin., LLC, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of
23
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was based on: (i) lack of geographic barriers to access;25 (ii) better
identification of creditworthy customers through data driven processes
that consider additional sources of credit information;26 (iii) new
the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (considering how expansion of fintech products
and services will create more access for consumers); Letter from Stephen
Denis, Small Bus. Fin. Ass’n, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the
Currency (Jan. 12, 2017) (discussing how emerging technology and the
development of new platforms are allowing alternative lenders to reach
underserved businesses and those that traditional finance will not or cannot
serve); Letter from Robert S. Lavet, Gen. Counsel, Social Fin., Inc. (Jan. 12,
2017) (highlighting how fintech is serving groups with few ties to traditional
banks and homeowners not well served by traditional mortgage lenders);
Letter from Safa Mahzari, entrepreneur, to Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (Dec. 27, 2016).
25
Letter from Albert Goldstein, CEO, Avant, Inc., to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017) (raising fintech’s ability to offer
consumers ability to access more credit opportunities than those available in
the neighborhoods); Letter from Dafina Williams, Opportunity Fin. Network,
to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017) (discussing
the presence of bank deserts, especially in low income communities and
communities of color, with marketplace lenders filling the gap); Letter from
Peter Renton, Co-founder & Chairman, LendIt Conference LLC, Founder &
CEO, Lend Academy LCC, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency
(Jan. 13, 2017) (considering fintech’s contribution to the elimination of
geographic barriers).
26
Letter from Scott Talbott, Senior VP of Gov’t Affairs, Elec. Transactions
Ass’n, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017)
(“Fintech platforms have also been used by Community Development
Financial Institutions (‘CDFIs’) and other non-profit community lenders and
development organizations to help increase efficiency in the lending process
and better identify creditworthy small businesses.”); Letter from Richard
Eckman, Attorney, Pepper Hamilton on behalf of LEND360, to Thomas J.
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017); Letter from Joan Aristei,
Vice President, Regulatory Legal & Compliance, Oportun Inc., to Thomas J.
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan 13, 2017) (“Oportun also helps these
‘credit invisible’ customers establish a credit history by reporting their
payments to two of the three nationwide credit reporting agencies.“); Letter
from Scott Askins, Gen. Counsel, Kabbage, Inc., to Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (“FinTechs are well-positioned to diversify
their business by expanding into other non-deposit business lines, such as
technology licensing and paid advanced data insights for customers.”); Letter
from Lisa S. McGreevy, President & CEO, Online Lenders Alliance, to
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017); Letter from
David Klein, CEO & Founder, CommonBond, Inc., to Thomas J. Curry,
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product offerings, including lower loan size;27 (iv) lower search,
transaction and underwriting costs for both borrower and lender;28 (v)
diminished opportunity for human bias in underwriting;29 and (vi) the
ability to reach the unbanked through electronic access.30 Faster, more
convenient access to credit was the second most frequently expected
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2016) (“The OCC can ensure that
perceived concentration risks are mitigated by ensuring appropriate capital
and liquidity requirements and asset ratios are maintained–in proportion to a
fintech firm’s size, credit quality, and business model type –to offset the
particular risks of each authorized activity.”).
27
Conor French, Gen. Counsel, Funding Circle, to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes,
Exec. Dir., Marketplace Lending Ass’n, to Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from Lisa S. McGreevy, supra note 26;
Letter from Richard H. Neiman, Head of Regulatory & Gov’t Affairs,
Lending Club, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17,
2017) (explaining small businesses seeking smaller loans difficult to access
from traditional banks); Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., to
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (proposing to
focus on lending generally below $150,000, an underserved segment of the
market).
28
Letter from Frank Altman, President & Chief Exec. Officer, and Nick
Elders, Vice President, Cmty. Reinvestment Fund USA, to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining that in the post-Great
Recession regulatory framework, small loans under $250,000 cost the same to
originate as those over $250,000); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes, supra note
27; Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (explaining the steps the
Lending Club uses to lower banking costs, allowing the savings to be passed
onto customers in the form of lower rates and better returns); Letter from
Jennifer Tescher, President & CEO, Jeanne Hogarth, Vice President, Ctr. for
Fin. Servs. Innovation, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan.
17, 2017) (describing technology costs that have lowered costs).
29
Letter from Conor French, supra note 27 (explaining how the proposal
would increase consistency across customers and provide equitable access to
uniform credit opportunities); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes, supra note 27;
Letter from Brian Peters, Exec. Dir., Fin. Innovation NOW, to Thomas J.
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2016) (“The CRA model would
not be appropriate for most Fintechs due to the lack of branches and the
declining relevance of geography and diminished opportunity for human bias
made more possible by delivery of financial services via the mobile
internet.”).
30
Letter from Manuel P. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Affirm Inc., to Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2016) (explaining Affirm’s belief that
technology is the key to expanding access to the unbanked).
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benefit of fintech lending.31 This encompassed less time needed to
apply,32 faster loan approvals,33 user friendly access,34 24/7 access,35
and real time information and advice that aids decision-making by
borrowers.36 Lower costs of borrowing was a third benefit expected,
although the number of commentators expressing this expectation was
far fewer than the first two benefits previously discussed.37 Through
the use of technology that lowers costs to facilitate loans, commentators expected more affordable loans and lower interest rates.38
The other expected benefits were each voiced by one or two
commentators in each instance. Commenters expected less systemic
risk due to the diversification of types and geographic location of,
31

Letter from Conor French, supra note 27 (listing “[e]quitable access to
credit opportunities as a result of uniformity” as one of the public policy
benefits of a nationwide regulatory framework for fintech companies).
32
Id. at 3. (critiquing the “almost 25 hours” needed to complete paperwork for
small business loans).
33
Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26, at 1 (enabling small businesses
receive credit decision in fewer than seven minutes and can quickly access
funds); Letter from Nathaniel L. Hoopes, supra note 27 (explaining how the
new technology provides faster loan approvals, which is important because
few can afford to wait weeks or months for a loan decision); Letter from Scott
Talbot, supra note 26.
34
Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (discussing how to allow
borrowers to access loans through a fast and easy interface); Letter from
Richard C. Litman to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Jan.
15, 2017) (explaining that fintech provides services that are more accessible
and user friendly for small businesses and consumers); Letter from John A.
Costa, Managing Dir., Auriemma Consulting Grp., to Thomas J. Curry 5 (Jan.
13, 2017); ; Letter from Masayuki Hosaka, President, Rakuten Card Co., Ltd.,
Vice Chairman & Fintech Segment Leader, Rakuten, Inc., to Beth
Knickerbocker, Acting Chief Innovation Officer, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency 2 (Jan. 12, 2015) (discussing benefits of fintech, including faster
transaction times, and improved customer access and experience); see also
Letter from Peter Renton, supra note 25 (Jan. 13, 2017) (explaining how most
fintechs have high NPS scores, which gauges customers’ overall satisfaction).
35
Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26, at 2 (“Automated, data-driven
lending technology and flexible funding distribution options with 24/7 online
access fill a notable gap in the lending marketplace and provide a critical
service, particularly for time-strapped business owners.”).
36
Letter from Jennifer Tescher & Jeanne M. Hogarth, supra note 28, at 6.
37
See OCC Public Comments, supra note 21.
38
Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (explaining how Lending
Club allows borrowers to access lower interest rate loans at a lower cost).
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diversification of loan terms, and eliminating borrower or depositor
assets from being at risk.39 Commenters also expected less privacy and
data security risk because fintech firms are often the first to integrate
higher security measures.40 The use of automated, objective lending
techniques created an expectation of minimalizing bias in lending decisions.41 Finally, commenters expected improved loan portfolio performance because fintech lenders collect, generate, and maintain extensive performance data on borrowers and the industry, and persistent
corrections provide insight to borrowers’ ongoing risk profile.42
The most commonly expected risk of fintech lending commentators voiced was predatory lending. The type of conduct identified as possible risks were: (i) very high interest rates based, in part, on
risk adjusted rates and borrower willingness to pay more due to
concerns about barriers to access to credit;43 (ii) encouraging constant
renewal of loans and double charging fees when loans are renewed;44
(iii) unaffordable repayment terms, such as repayment from gross

39

Id.; Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26.
Letter from Brian Peters, supra note 29 (discussing how fintech companies
are usually among the first to integrate higher securities measures, such as
tokenization of payment data and two-factor authentication).
41
Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26; Letter from Nathaniel L. Hoopes,
supra note 33 (highlighting more consistent outcomes from automated
decisions).
42
Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26.
43
Letter from Adam Rust, Dir. of Research, Reinvestment Partners, and
Marceline White, Exec. Dir., Md. Consumer Rights Coal., to Thomas Curry,
Comptroller (Jan. 14, 2017) (discussing risk adjusted rates); Letter from
Kevin Stein, Cal. Reinvestment Coal., to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the
Currency (Jan. 14, 2017) (discussing concerns about barriers to accessing
credit). Many comments expressed concern over the risk of high interest rates
and predatory lending practices. See, e.g., Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law
Ctr., Consumers Union, Main St. All., and U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from
Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27 (explaining how APRs are
commonly above 50% and can reach 300%); Letter from Eric Weaver, Chief
Exec. Officer, Opportunity Fund, to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the
Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (highlighting average APRs of 94%).
44
Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from
Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43.
40
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revenue;45 and (iv) hidden or deceptive prepayment charges, or an
inability to prepay at all or without penalty.46
A second expected risk of fintech lending was a unique risk of
fair lending violations. Commenters feared the disparate impact of data
driven decisions, specifically due to the use of data to make inferences
based on group profiles,47 the use of algorithms that may have discriminatory factors embedded in their formulas,48 the use of data containing errors,49and the potential redlining of borrowers with limited social
networks50 or neighborhoods through the ability of investors to configure borrower profiles.51
A third expected risk of fintech lending was a lack of transparency. This encompassed risks for borrowers, such as (i) opaque and
unclear loan terms and conditions, including failure to disclose rates on
small business loans and obfuscation of high financing costs;52 and (ii)
45

Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from
Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43; Letter from Kevin Stein,
supra note 43.
46
Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter From
Michelle Sternthal, Deputy Dir. of Policy & Gov’t Affairs, Main St. All., to
Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 16, 2017).
47
Letter from Jeff Chester & Katharina Kopp, Ctr. for Dig. Democracy,
Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp., to Thomas Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017).
48
Letter from A-1 Cmty. Hous. Serv., et al., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller
of the Currency (Jan. 14, 2017). See also Letter from Gregory W. Meeks,
Cedric L. Richmond, Gwen Moore, Terri A. Sewell, Donald M. Payne, &
Tony Cardenas, Members of Cong., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the
Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (referencing a 2016 White House report that
“provided a number of examples of the unintended consequences of
technological innovation for underserved communities, including ‘the
potential to perpetuate, exacerbate, or mask discrimination’”).
49
Letter from Chester, & Kopp, & Mierzwinski, supra note 47 (reminding the
OCC of its duty to prevent nonbank lenders and affiliated depository
institutions from engaging in discriminatory lending practices by using
“alternative data” that often contains errors that lead to unfair treatment of
consumers).
50
Letter from Gregory W. Meeks, et. al., supra note 48.
51
Letter from Frank Altman & Nick Elders, supra note 28 (highlighting how
fintech investors can configure investor profiles in order to target specific
groups in the market, including “the ability to define neighborhoods she
wishes to lend to” which is against federal law prohibiting “redlining”).
52
See Letter from Richard Neiman, supra note 27; Letter from the
Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from Members of

736

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

VOL. 38

use of underwriting methods and pricing metrics that borrowers would
not understand.53 This also extended to risks for investors, and —
especially unsophisticated investors in peer-to-peer lending, due to
issues surrounding transparency and complexity issues.54
These first three risks were voiced by the largest number of
commentators.55 Several commentators voiced two additional risks.56
One risk was an expected threat to customer privacy.57 This is because
fintech lenders collect and use a broad spectrum of personal information to make financial decisions, and may be subject to cybersecurity
risks.58 A second risk several commentators voiced was possible
Main St. All., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Jan. 16,
2017) (expressing concern that the proposed fintech charter would placer
small businesses “at grave financial risk”); Letter from Eric Weaver, supra
note 43. See also Letter from John Taylor, President & CEO, Nat’l Cmty.
Reinvestment Coal., to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13,
2017) (voicing an urgent need for the OCC to enforce rigorous standards of
safety and soundness when assigning fintech charters given recent concerns of
“the possibility of payday lenders and other unscrupulous actors applying for
fintech charters.”).
53
Letter from Richard Neiman, supra note 27. See also Letter from Adam
Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 (“As the Treasury Department’s
research on online marketplace lending notes the underlying operations and
underwriting models remain fairly untested.”).
54
Letter from Brian Simmonds Marshall, Policy Counsel, Ams. for Fin.
Reform, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 7 (Jan. 15, 2017)
(“[P]eer-to-peer online lending platforms . . . are by definition funded entirely
by frequently unsophisticated retail investors.”).
55
OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (listing public comments solicited
on the exploration SPNB bank charters for fintechs).
56
Id. (listing public comments to OCC exploration).
57
Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 49–50 (dedicating
significant discussion to consumer privacy concerns); Letter from Richard H.
Neiman, supra note 27; Letter from Andrew Morris, Regulatory Affairs
Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Federally-Insured Credit Unions, to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency 3 (Jan. 14, 2017); Letter from Chester, Kopp, &
Mierzwinski, supra note 47.
58
Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 49–50 (highlighting
the importance of personal information with regard to fintechs); Letter from
Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 at 18–19 (“The charterholder should have
in place robust security controls to safeguard the personal information of
borrowers and investors and to prevent unauthorized access of information.”);
Andrew Morris, supra note 56; Letter from Chester, Kopp, & Mierzwinski,
supra note 47, at 2 (“The use of personal data by Fintech companies is
pervasive and touches every aspect of their business operation, including
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delinquency and default risk.59 One aspect of this risk focuses on the
lenders, which are new firms with “evolving business models that have
not been fully tested.”60 Another aspect of default risk focuses on the
borrower.61 Fintechs use new lending models based on recentlydeveloped algorithms that have not yet been adequately tested.62 Their
portfolios have yet to experience periods of recession and economic
distress “that could impact repayment, delinquency, and losses.”63
Finally, at least one commentator identified two additional
risks.64 First was the ability of government to understand and effectively regulate the business models and algorithms of fintech lenders,
as well as its ability to respond to market changes.65 The second risk
marketing, customer loyalty management, pricing, fraud prevention, and
underwriting.”).
59
Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 30 (discussing a
responsible lending program as one that adequately deals with risk of default);
Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 6 (pointing out that fintechs do
not have experience handing delinquencies or similar situations); Letter from
John Taylor, supra note 52, at 2 (supporting a uniform regulatory regime
including fintechs to reduce risks).
60
Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 11 (pointing out the
novelty of fintechs and the consequences if they were to become national too
quickly). See also Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25 (“Once the
marketplace lending portfolios . . . experience a recession, it will be clear [if]
new streams of data . . . and predictive analytics added value to the overall
lending risk and default equation,” citing Letter from Frank Altman, President
& Chief Exec. Officer, Nick Elders, Vice President, Cmty. Reinvestment
Fund USA, to Laura Temel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Sept. 30, 2015)).
61
Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 4 (observing predatory fintech
loans and providing suggestions to reduce risks related to minority and low
income borrowers).
62
Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 4 (“Many of the technology platforms
and algorithm-based lending models used by fintech companies to underwrite
loans and assess risk are new and untested business models.”).
63
Id. at 4 (describing the lack of adverse market conditions since many
fintechs began operating); Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note
43 at 11; Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 2 (listing recession as a
key risk to lenders).
64
Letter from Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 at 1 (advising
against allowing fintechs to get an SPNB charter); Letter from Dafina
Williams, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the speed that fintechs adjust to
changing external environments).
65
Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 5 (“Advancements in
technology have created a fast paced world in which business models and
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was that of further exclusion of unbanked and low-income consumers
was raised.66 This fear results from a business model that relies on
automated clearing houses for repayments and that encounters literacy,
numeracy, and technology challenges many low-income consumers
experience.67
The benefits and risks noted in these surveys were those that
knowledgeable industry, government, and consumer stakeholders
believed were likely outcomes as the fintech lending industry
emerged.68 Section II of this article examines whether these outcomes
were realized.
II.

Part Two: Market Outcomes

Have the expected benefits of fintech lending been realized?
Have the expected risks of fintech lending surfaced? Anecdotal
evidence is not presented. The article relies not on anecdotal evidence,
but on outcomes measured by studies of substantial data sets of various
types of loans.
A.

Expanded Access Benefit

The most frequently mentioned expected benefit of fintech
lending in the OCC Public Comments was expanded access to credit.69
Many studies have addressed this expectation,70 and have explored
various factors that might lead fintech firms to produce this benefit.71
They have examined the sizes of loans available, the sizes and ages of

underwriting algorithms can be adjusted quickly, but the ability of
government to respond to these changes is far more limited.”).
66
Letter from Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 at 3.
67
Id. (“[M]any [lenders] are not equipped to address the literacy, numeracy,
and technological challenges that many low-income consumers experience.”).
68
OCC Public Comments, supra note 21 (listing possible costs and benefits of
a special-purpose fintech charter).
69
See id. (stating expanded access to credit most frequently as one of the
benefits of a special-purpose fintech charter).
70
Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the World: Size, Drivers
and Policy Issues, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 29, 39 (Sept. 2018)
(citing several studies as “evidence that fintech platforms have widened
access to credit.”).
71
Id. at 39–40.
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businesses applying for credit, the geographic distribution of lenders
and borrowers, and the creditworthiness of borrowers.72
As will be explored below, overall, market outcomes indicate
fintech lenders have increased access to credit, although the evidence
is divided on whether fintech firms make credit available to borrowers
who are less creditworthy under traditional underwriting standards.
Studies documenting market outcomes are in agreement that
fintech lending increases access to credit for borrowers seeking smaller
loans.73 Tang examined access to credit in the consumer loan market
using LendingClub loans as the data set.74 This data set consisted of
loan applications and originations by LendingClub in the period
between 2009 to 2012, as well as data from annual Call Reports from
banking institutions. When examining loan size, Tang concluded peerto-peer platforms operate “as complements to banks by offering
smaller loans.”75 Jagtiani and Lemieux's 2016 study of fintech lenders76 confirms that fintech lenders make available smaller loans. The
table of underwriting terms of fintech lenders they collected documents how many lenders make loans available in amounts as low as
$2,000 or $3,000.77
Increased access to credit was also an expectation that was
intended to address the difficulties faced by smaller businesses,
younger firms, and minority-owned firms in accessing credit through
traditional credit channels. Wiersch, Kipman, and Barkley analyzed
the results of the Federal Reserve Banks’ 2015 Small Business Credit

72

Id. (identifying possible beneficiaries of fintech lending including smaller
business and less affluent individuals whose access to bank credit is limited).
73
See generally Huan Tang, Peer-to-Peer Lenders versus Banks: Substitutes
or Complements?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1900 (2019).
74
Id. at 1902.
75
Id.
76
See generally Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Small Business
Lending after the Financial Crisis: A New Competitive Landscape for
Community Banks, Economic Perspectives, 2016, https://www.chicagofed.
org/publications/economic-perspectives/2016/3-jagtiani-lemieux (discussing
the increased competition in the market for small business loans, which has
traditionally been dominated by community banks, because of new
technology such as fintech, but also because big banks have entered the
market).
77
Id. at 21 (stating that the range of loan amounts offered by LendingClub
and Prosper Marketplace).(E.S. changed the pincite to the actual page that the
table is on).
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Survey.78 That survey received responses from 3,459 employer firms.79
Barkley et al. reported first on applications for loans, and found that
online lender applicants are smaller firms (83% have annual revenues
of $1 million or less), younger firms (those in existence for five or
fewer years), and are more likely to be minority-owned firms (36% of
the online applicant pool compared to 14% of traditional-source
applicants).80
They then reported on loan approvals. They found that of
applicants that applied to online lenders, large banks and small banks
were more likely to be approved by online lenders for at least some of
the financing sought.81 Among online lender applicants, 71% were
approved for at least some financing at online lenders, compared to
28% at small banks and 17% at large banks.82
The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey received responses
from 10,303 employer firms,83 and confirmed that smaller firms are
more likely to apply for loans at online lenders.84 It also found small
firms were more likely to be approved at online lenders compared to

78

ANN MARIE WIERSCH ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, CLICK,
SUBMIT: NEW INSIGHTS ON ONLINE LENDER APPLICANTS FROM THE SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY (2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroomand-events/publications/special-reports/sr-20161012-click-submit.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9HWM-YY4J].
79
Id. at 2 (“The participating Reserve Banks released in March 2016 the
findings for the sample’s 3,459 employer firms.”).
80
Id. at 4 (“Online lender applicants are smaller, younger, and more likely to
be minority-owned.”).
81
Id. at 8 (“Firms that applied to online lenders had lower success rates,
although 77 percent of these applicants received at least some credit.”).
82
Id. at 8 (providing graphs showing the success rate of applicants who
applied for funding from online lenders).
83
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL., 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT
SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS (2017), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/2016/SBCS-Report-EmployerFirms2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN4F-CVTP] [hereinafter 2016 SMALL BUSINESS
CREDIT SURVEY] (“The 2016 SBCS, which was fielded in Q3 and Q4 2016,
yielded 10,303 responses from employer firms in 50 states and the District of
Columbia.”).
84
Id. (showing that twenty-one percent of small business credit applicants
applied to online lenders, but this share was 26% of smaller applicants (with
revenues of $1 million or less) compared to 12% of larger applicants).
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large banks and credit unions.85 However, such firms were equally
likely to be approved at small banks.86
Studies documenting market outcomes have also concluded
that fintech lenders remove geographic barriers and constraints to
credit availability.87 Jagtiani & Lemieux examined LendingClub’s
consumer loans that originated from 2010 to 2016 and compared them
to credit card loans that carry balances reported to the Federal Reserve
in the 2014–2016 period by banks with at least $50 billion in assets.88
They examined the geographic distribution of loans89 and concluded:
LendingClub’s consumer lending activities have
penetrated areas that could benefit from additional
credit supply, especially highly concentrated banking
markets and other areas that have fewer bank
branches per capita. Finally . . . LendingClub had a
higher market share in areas where economic variables indicated a more challenging environment . . .
evidence that fintech lenders can fill credit gaps in
areas where bank offices may be less available and
the local economy may be more challenging.90
Studies documenting market outcomes are divided, however,
on whether fintech lenders increase access to credit to borrowers with

85

Id. at 16. (showing that approval rates for firms with $1 million or less of
revenue were 59% at online lenders, 45% at large banks and 43% at credit
unions).
86
Id. (reporting an approval rate at small banks for such firms of sixty percent
and an approval rate at community development financial institutions of
seventy-seven percent).
87
See, e.g., Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Do Fintech Lenders
Penetrate Areas That Are Underserved by Traditional Banks? 5–6 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 18-13, 2018), https://doi.org/
10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.13 (“This analysis points to the possibility that fintech
lenders can provide credit in areas that may be underserved by traditional
banks.”).
88
Id. at 5–6 (setting out the methodology and analytical framework of the
study).
89
Id. at 9 (concluding that consumer lending was concentrated in the
Northeast and West Coast).
90
Id. at 5–14.
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credit challenges under traditional creditworthiness criteria.91 Jagtiani
& Lemieux examined loan-level data on loans originated by
LendingClub in its consumer platform, in the period 2007–2017, as the
data set to correlate lending to credit scores.92 They found “the use of
nontraditional information from alternative data sources has allowed
consumers with fewer or inaccurate credit records (based on FICO
scores) to have access to credit. Some creditworthy consumers (but
who have poor FICO scores) have been identified using additional
information and have been rated as low-risk borrowers by
LendingClub.”93
The 2017 Small Business Credit Survey received responses
from 8,169 employer firms.94 It explored credit applicants’ approval
rates by comparing low credit risk applicants and medium/high credit
risk applicants.95 The approval rate among medium/high credit risk
applicants was 71% at non-bank alternative and marketplace lenders,
35% at large banks, 47% at small banks and 26% at credit unions.96
91

Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and
Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the Lending Club
Consumer Platform 6–7 (Working Paper No. 18-15, 2018) https://doi.org/
10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.15 [https://perma.cc/N259-6E8T] (examining, in
addition, loan level data in Y-14M reports submitted by banks, deposit market
concentration data and bank information based on the FDIC summary of
deposits database, and economic factors from the U.S. Census Bureau and the
Haver Analytics database).
92
Id. at 6–7 (comparing account-level credit card data with consumer loans
made for credit card payoff).
93
Id. at 18. This study is a refinement of the earlier one conducted by Jagtiani
and Lemieux in which they compared average FICO scores and concluded
“Lending Club borrowers do not have very low FICO scores. Their average
FICO score is only very slightly below the average of overall Equifax consumers . . . .” Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial
Inclusion, Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/cfr/bank-research-conference/annual-17th/papers/14-jagtiani.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JP8X-SK4C].
94
See generally FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL., 2017 SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS (2017), https://
www fedsmallbusiness.org/medialibrary/fedsmallbusiness/files/2018/sbcsemployer-firms-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G55X-84QY] [hereinafter 2017
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY].
95
Id.
96
Id. at 26. Low credit risk was defined as 80–100 business credit score or
720+ personal credit score. Medium credit risk was defined as 50–79 business

2018-2019

FINTECH LENDING

743

However, not all studies found that fintech lending increased
access to credit for borrowers with creditworthiness challenges.97
TransUnion’s study of the personal loan market between 2014 and
2016 concluded that fintech borrowers do not turn to fintech lenders as
their only source of funding.98 Instead, “FinTech consumers typically
have other loans, and have a similar distribution and penetration to
bank and credit union consumers. FinTech consumers elect to incorporate FinTech loans into their broader personal finance portfolio.”99
This does not mean that fintech lenders do not increase access to credit
at all, but rather suggests that the majority of fintech borrowers qualify
for loans through traditional credit channels.
Tang also examined access to credit in the consumer loan
market using LendingClub loans in the 2009–2012 period as the data
set.100 When examining borrower quality based on FICO scores, the
study concluded that “P2P [peer-to-peer] loans are substitutes to bank
loans,”101 that is, they serve the same customers. Tang found the same
results when borrower quality was measured by combining FICO
score, debt-to-income ratio, and length of employment.102 Tang concluded that “[o]verall, these findings indicate that P2P platforms are
substitutes for banks in that they serve the same borrower population.”103
Finally, Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski & Serie examined mortgage loans originated in the 2007–2015 period.104 They examined
credit score or a 630–719 personal credit score. High credit risk was defined
as a 1-49 business credit score or a personal credit score equal to or less than
620. Id.
97
See, e.g., John Wirth, Fact or Fiction: Are FinTechs Different than Other
Lenders?, TRANSUNION (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.transunion.com/blog/
fact-or-fiction-are-fintechs-different-than-other-lenders
[https://perma.cc/HUK2-5E7D] (showcasing a study that did not find that
fintech lending increased access to credit for borrowers with creditworthiness
challenges).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See generally Tang, supra note 73.
101
Id. at 3.
102
Id. at 4–5.
103
Id. at 5.
104
See generally Greg Buchak et al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the
Rise of Shadow Banks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23288, Sept. 2018), http://www nber.org/papers/W23288 [https://perma.cc/
UB8H-N6PT]. The data sets used consisted of loan-level and area-level data
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traditional banks’ loans, non-fintech shadow banks’ loans, and fintech
loans.105 They concluded “[f]intech lenders serve different segments of
the mortgage market than non-fintech shadow banks . . . .”106 Further,
“fintech lenders are less likely to serve less creditworthy FHA borrowers and higher unemployment geographies.”107 Additionally, “fintech
lenders’ origination activity overwhelmingly focuses on refinancing[.]”108 One possible reason is that the more standardized tasks
involved in mortgage refinancing are the best fit for fintech technology.109
Studies also dispute the expectation that fintech lending can
increase access to credit among the unbanked.110 The OCC Public
Comments identified use of technology by fintech lenders as the basis
for increased access to credit by unbanked or underbanked individuals.111 A study by McHenry, Goldberg, Lewis, Carlson, & Mehta
provides evidence of challenges in achieving this expected benefit.112
collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Fannie Mae SingleFamily Loan Performance data in the 2000–16 period, Freddie Mac loan-level
data for the 2005–15 period, FHA insured single-family loan data in the
2010–16 period, and U.S. Census data.
105
See id. at 2–3 (studying how “regulatory differences and technological
advantages” contributed to changes in the mortgage loans market).
106
Id. at 4.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 17 (speculating that fintech technology is better suited for mortgage
refinancing because it involves a more standardized procedure than new
purchases).
110
See, e.g., Giulia McHenry et al., Digital and Financial Inclusion: How
Internet Adoption Impacts Banking Status 4 (Nat’l Telecomm. & Info.
Admin., Working Paper, 2017) (“Fintech promises to bring economic inclusion and lower financial costs to un(der)banked populations. Our research
suggests, however, that these populations are also often less digitally
connected than other groups. Minimal digital adoption could represent a
significant barrier to adoption of fintech services for many underserved
individuals.”).
111
OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (positing that the main benefit of
easing regulations on fintech companies is the increase in access to banking
services for members of the American population who currently do not have
access to them).
112
McHenry et al., supra note 110, at 4 (“Unfortunately, the most recent 2015
supplement on Internet and computer use by the US Department of
Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) shows that the digital divide persists. In 2015, 27 percent of US
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It examined data from the 2015 FDIC Unbanked and Underbanked
survey and the 2015 U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration survey,113 and found that 45% of unbanked
households used neither a personal computer nor mobile device,
compared to 17% of underbanked and fully banked households.114
Overall, the authors concluded:
Fintech promises to bring economic inclusion . . . to
the un(der)banked populations. Our research suggests,
however, that these populations are also often less
digitally connected than other groups. Minimal digital
adoption could represent a significant barrier to adoption of fintech services for many underserved individuals. Reaching these communities could require a
combination of financial and digital literacy training.115
B.

Speed and Convenience Benefit

The benefit of speed and convenience in the application
process for fintech loans and in the receipt of loan proceeds was a
frequently repeated expectation in the OCC Public Comments.116
Available studies focus on small business loans and help document the
existence of this benefit and also its degree—namely, the speed at

households did not use the Internet at home and 21 percent of households did
not go online anywhere. Further, only 73 percent of Americans used a mobile
Internet service.”).
113
Id. at 6–7 (“The FDIC’s supplement to the CPS, the ‘National Survey of
Unbanked and Underbanked,’ was first fielded in 2009, partly in response to a
Congressional mandate, to help measure trends in banking inclusiveness.
Similar to NTIA, the FDIC publishes reports following its biennial survey
with key findings. These comprehensive reports provide a wealth of
information related to the un(der)banked, including the current banking status
of households, change in banking status, types of banking activities, income
volatility, and reasons households were unbanked, among other things.”).
114
Id. at 17, tbl. 3.
115
Id. at 4.
116
OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (highlighting the difference
between service times, availability of assistance, and customer care between
traditional lenders and fintech companies).
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which applications are processed and loan proceeds distributed.117
Overall, existence of the speed/convenience benefit was evidenced by
the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Small Business Credit Surveys conducted by
Federal Reserve Banks.118 The surveys compare satisfaction levels
among applicants at large banks, small banks, and online lenders.119 In
the 2017 survey, 28% of applicants were dissatisfied with a difficult
application process at large banks, compared with 24% at small banks,
and 10% at online lenders.120 In addition, 33% of applicants were
dissatisfied with a long wait for a credit decision or funding at large
banks, compared to 25% at small banks and 10% at online lenders.121
The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey asked for applicants’
primary reasons for dissatisfaction with particular lenders.122 In
response to this question, 44% of applicants at large banks cited the
difficult application process as the primary reason for their dissatisfaction, compared to 42% of applicants at small banks and 26% of
applicants at online lenders.123 The contrast between large banks and
online lenders widened when applicants were asked about long waits
for credit decisions.124 For this factor, 44% of applicants at large banks
cited a long wait for a credit decision as the primary reason for
dissatisfaction, compared with 45% at small banks, and 17% at online

117

2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94 (emphasizing that
bank applicants answered that they were most dissatisfied with long wait
times for credit decisions or funding decisions); 2016 SMALL BUSINESS
CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL.,
2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FORMS
(2016),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/2015/ReportSBCS-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9D5-7SRX] [hereinafter 2015 SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY] (featuring responses from 3,459 employer firms).
118
2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016 SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT
SURVEY, supra note 117.
119
2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016 SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT
SURVEY, supra note 117.
120
2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94.
121
Id. (demonstrating survey results indicating the percentage of borrowers
dissatisfied with long wait times).
122
2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at 17.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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lenders.125 The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey also asked
successful applicants the reason(s) for any dissatisfaction.126 Similar to
the 2016 Small Business Credit Survey, a difficult application process
was cited as a reason for dissatisfaction by 51% of applicants at large
banks, 52% at small banks, and 21% at online lenders.127 A long wait
for a credit decision was cited as a reason for dissatisfaction by 45% of
applicants at large banks, 43% of applicants at small banks, and 22%
of applicants at online lenders.128 The evidence from the preceding
studies confirms the existence of the expectation of convenience in the
application process and greater speed for credit decisions from fintech
lenders.129 It also indicates, however, that convenience and speed are
not characteristic of all fintech lenders.130
Jagtiani & Lemieux also studied experiences with small business loans.131 They examined the application and funding timelines
reported on the websites of Fintech lenders.132 Application times
advertised varied from “minutes” to “less than 10 minutes.”133 Funding
times varied from “minutes,” to “as little as 2 business days,” to
“fewer than 10 business days.”134 This data is not as useful as that in
the small business credit surveys. It documents advertised business
practices as opposed to actual outcomes, and makes no comparison to
application or funding timelines for small business loans at traditional
lenders.135 It does however document fintech lender targets for the
services they are providing.136

125

Id.
2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at 14.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See id.; 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at 17; 2015
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at 14.
130
See generally 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS
CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117.
131
Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 76, at 4–16 (examining small business
loans from nonbank institutions).
132
Id. at 21–22 tbl. 2.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See id. at 1–24.
136
Id.
126

748

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

VOL. 38

Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York studied
experiences with respect to mortgage loans.137 They used loan level
data “on the near-universe of U.S. mortgages from 2010 to 2016.”138
They found fintech lenders reduced “processing time by 10 days, or
20% of the average processing time.”139 The effect was larger for
refinance mortgages (14.6 days), and smaller for purchase mortgages
(9.2 days).140
Overall, in both the small business loan market and the mortgage market, researchers have documented improved experiences in
speed of processing and/or funding of loan applications on the part of
fintech lenders.
C.

Lower Cost Benefit/Predatory Lending Risk

The OCC Public Comments based their expectation of lower
costs on the pass through of lower transaction costs by fintech
lenders.141 By contrast, the expected risk of predatory lending was, in
part, based on risk adjusted rates—a consequence of reaching borrowers that would not qualify for credit from traditional lenders.142 However, it was also based on negative effects of behavioral decision
making. These negative effects include borrower acceptance of higher
rates due to concerns about limited access to credit, hidden charges
and fees, and lenders encouraging renewal of loans.143
This article separates studies that focus on differentials in rates
and fees (i.e., if fintech lenders provide lower cost of funds for
borrowers) and studies that address issues of predatory lending.
1. Lower Cost Benefit
Past studies focusing on differentials in rates and fees reached
varying conclusions. Some studies found fintech lenders charged
lower interest rates to borrowers. Jagtiani & Lemieux compared loan
137

See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1 (studying “the effects of FinTech
lending on the U.S. mortgage market”).
138
Id. at 2.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1.
141
See generally OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (showcasing the
responses to the OCC’s Request for Comments).
142
Id.
143
Id.
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level data on consumer loans made by LendingClub from 2007–2017
with credit card loan data reported to the Federal Reserve by bank
holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets.144 They
concluded that “given the same credit risk (i.e., for borrowers with the
same expected delinquency rate), consumers would be able to obtain
credit at a lower rate through LendingClub than through traditional
credit card loans offered by banks.”145 In their study, lower transaction
costs were not identified as a source of the lower rates.146 Interestingly,
the study identified the source of cost savings as the use of alternative
data, allowing some borrowers, who would be classified as subprime
using traditional lending criteria, to achieve “‘better’ loan grades and
therefore obtain lower-priced credit. [Moreover], it does not appear
that this credit is ‘mispriced’ in terms of default risk . . . .”147
Wolfe and Yoo compared consumer loans made by banks
from 2009–2015 with loans made by Prosper Marketplace and
LendingClub.148 They estimated that “the average bank issues loans at
rates approximately 164 BPs [basis points] higher that the peer-to-peer
platform Prosper after accounting for origination fees.”149
Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, & Seru studied mortgage loans
originated by traditional banks, non-fintech shadow banks, and fintech
lenders in the period between 2000–2015.150 In contrast to the findings
reported by Wolfe and Yoo above, they found that “[f]intech firms
charge 13 basis points more than traditional banks to observably
similar borrows in the same zip code and quarter.”151 Furthermore, the
144

Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 87, at 5 (“We compare account-level credit
card data that large banks submitted to the Federal Reserve for stress testing
with online consumer loans that were made for credit card payoff (and debt
consolidation) purposes. These data will allow us to investigate the determinants for risk pricing used by LendingClub and the performance of these loans
over time as well as serving to compare these loans with similar loans made
by traditional banks.”).
145
Id. at 12. The study did not include origination fees in its calculations.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 12.
148
Brian Wolfe & Woongsun Yoo, Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution
by Peer-to-Peer Lending 11, 12, 14 (Univ. of Buffalo Sch. of Mgmt., 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000593 (examining the
FDIC Summary of Deposits database and the Call Reports filed by banking
institutions).
149
Id. at 35.
150
Buchak et al., supra note 104, at 2–4.
151
Id. at 18.
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difference between fintech and non-fintech shadow banks “is even
larger at 14-16 basis points.”152 The authors note “that this premium is
unlikely to be explained by differences in origination fees between
fintech and non-fintech lenders.”153 The reason for this difference is
not known, but the researchers posit that borrowers might pay a
premium for convenience, high income borrowers attracted to fintech
are less price elastic, or fintech lenders may be able to use big data to
better price discriminate.154
In a similar vein, surveys of small business owners consistently note dissatisfaction with interest rates charged by fintech lenders
and far less dissatisfaction with interest rates charged by traditional
bank lenders. The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by
various Federal Reserve banks asked successful applicants their reason(s) for dissatisfaction with various lenders in the small business
loan process.155 Of the successful applicants, 70% reported high interest rate as a reason for dissatisfaction with online lenders, compared to
18% of successful applicants at large banks and 15% of successful
applicants at small banks.156
The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by the
Federal Reserve banks asked successful applicants for their primary
reason for dissatisfaction with the small business loan process.157 High
interest rate was cited as the primary reason for dissatisfaction by 33%
of applicants to online lenders, compared to 6% of applicants to large
banks, and 3% of applicants to small banks.158
The 2017 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by the
Federal Reserve banks asked loan applicants what they were most
dissatisfied with in the small business loan process,159 and found that
online lender applicants were most dissatisfied with high interest
rates.160 In the survey, 52% of online lender applicants were most
dissatisfied with high interest rates, compared to 20% of applicants at
152

Id. at 18–19. The authors note this premium is unlikely to be explained by
differences in origination fees.
153
Id. at 19 n.21.
154
Id. at 28.
155
2015 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 117, at 14.
156
2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 116, at 14 (reporting
results of specific survey questions).
157
2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at 17.
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Id. at 17.
159
2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at 14 (reporting
results of the specific survey question).
160
Id.
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large banks and 12% of applicants at large banks and 12% of
applicants at small banks.161
The results of these various studies might be harmonized by
noting that several studies of online lenders have found interest rates
and fees vary. It is possible that the studies that used loans made by
Lending Club and Prosper as the basis for their analysis chose two
lenders that have shared cost savings with borrowers, while some or
many other online lenders have not shared cost savings.
Reported interest rates by fintech lenders vary widely. As
Jagtiani and Lemieux found:
Interest rates can be competitive with traditional
banks, but [nonbank alternative lenders] do report the
potential for much higher loan rates. For example,
Lending Club reports annualized percentage rates
(APR) of 6 percent to 36 percent for consumer loans
and 8 percent to 32 percent for business loans.
OnDeck Capital reports APR ranging from 14 percent
to 36 percent on their line of credit.162
OnDeck Capital also reports APRs ranging from 7.3% to 98.4% on
small business term loans.163
The New York State Department of Financial Services
surveyed online lenders operating within the State for years 2015–
2017,164 and received responses from thirty-five lenders. As for the
loans most commonly offered in 2017, respondents reported their
APRs reported a median APR of 15.7% and average APR of 14.8% on
loans to individuals for personal, investment or family purposes, but
these varied from 4.3% to 25%.165 For loans to individuals for business
or commercial purposes the median APR was 16.3%, and average
APR was 22.2%, but these varied from 10.0% to 62.3%.166 For loans
to businesses, the median APR was 18.5%, and the average APR was
25.9%, but the rates varied from 8.2% to 61.8%.167 The Department
noted that “[a]dditional information is required to evaluate what
161

2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 93, at 14.
Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 76, at 14.
163
Id. at 22.
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N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., ONLINE LENDING REPORT 1 (2018).
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Id. at 17.
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proportion of high APRs are driven by risk or by a high demand on the
part of consumers or sole proprietors and small businesses . . . .”168
2. Predatory Lending Risk
Very high interest rates charged by some online lenders for
some consumer or small business loans raised the distinct risk of
predatory lending, and predatory lending was the most frequent risk
commenters expressed in the OCC Public Comments.169 Commenters
voiced various aspects of this risk: very high interest rates, encouraging constant renewal and double charging fees, unaffordable terms
of repayment, and hidden or deceptive prepayment charges or an inability to prepay or without penalty.170 Opportunity Fund examined
small business loans received by 104 businesses representing a
“diverse swath of the California economy.”171 The study analyzed 150
loans from fifty-four different lenders, all of which were online and
alternative lenders.172 The study found the mean APR on these loans
was 93.9%, and the median APR was 72%.173 It observed that “APR
varied widely and inconsistently by borrower and business characteristics . . . . [T]he rate charged should decline as signs of potential risk
decrease, but such a pattern is not evident in the data set.”174
The Opportunity Fund report also examined whether terms of
repayment were affordable.175 It looked to business net income to
evaluate Cash Flow Available for Debt Service (CFADS).176 It found
that “nearly half (47%) of borrowers in the Opportunity Fund data set
168

Id.
See generally OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21.
170
See generally id.
171
Opportunity Fund is the nation’s largest nonprofit micro lender. See ERIC
WEAVER ET AL., OPPORTUNITY FUND, UNAFFORDABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE:
THE NEW BUSINESS LENDING 4 (May 2016), http://www.opportunityfund.org/
assets/docs/Unaffordable%20and%20UnsustainableThe%20New%20Business%20Lending%20on%20Main%20Street_Opportun
ity%20Fund%20Research%20Report_May%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5FZ-54H5].
172
Id.
173
Id. at 6 (observing that that “the alternative lending market subjects small
businesses to charges that many might consider usurious . . . .”).
174
Id. at 6.
175
Id. (suggesting that many alternative lenders induce otherwise creditworthy borrowers to take out overpriced loans).
176
Id.
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were devoting more than 100% of their monthly take-home pay to debt
repayment . . . .”177 On average, the portion of a small business
owner’s monthly net income devoted to payments to alternative
lenders was almost 178%.178 It found average monthly payments
varied widely by borrower and business characteristics, and among
Hispanic borrowers in the sample, the average monthly loan payment
was more than 400% of net income.179 However, the authors noted that
“not all alternative small-business lenders were offering” unsustainable
loan products;180 for example, some offered “sustainable loans of one
year or longer and APRs not exceeding 30%.”181 A distinct relevant
study conducted by Fuster et al. (discussed above),182 which examined
mortgage loans, does not compare interest rates on loans, but found
“little evidence the FinTech lenders disproportionately target marginal
borrowers with low access to finance.”183 Targeting vulnerable groups
is often viewed as a characteristic of predatory lending.184
D.

Fair Lending Risk/Benefit

The OCC Public Comments contain a divide in expectations
concerning possible fair lending violations.185 Some comments
expected automated, data driven underwriting would decrease the risk
of bias in lending decisions,186 while others feared that bias would be
embedded in the data or algorithms used by fintech lenders.187

177

Id. at 7.
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. (“It should be noted again that not all alternative small-business lenders
are offering toxic products.”).
181
Id.
182
See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1.
183
Id. at 4.
184
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260
(2002).
185
Compare WEAVER ET AL., supra note 171 (observing that small loans
frequently leave their borrowers in cycles of crushing debt), with Fuster, supra
note 4 (finding little evidence that FinTech lending disproportionately targets
minority borrowers).
186
Letter from Peter Renton, supra note 25 (“New data sources and the
application of artificial intelligence to the underwriting process means that
more people than ever before can access credit.”). See Letter from Scott
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There are few studies available concerning the risk/benefit of
fintech lending with respect to fair lending violations. Bartlett, Morse,
Stanton & Wallace studied the level of ethnic discrimination among
conventional and fintech lenders in the mortgage market.188 They
examined loan applications and approved loans sourced to government
sponsored entities (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) between 2007–
2012.189 They analyzed information at the loan level on income,
ethnicity, debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, contract terms,
and indicators for whether the lender used algorithmic underwriting.190
They concluded the following: “[a]fter controlling for observable
differences, we find that African-American and Hispanic borrowers
are almost 5% more likely to be rejected for a mortgage [by traditional
lenders] than other borrowers. . . .”191 By contrast, “[f]intech lenders
are nearly 1% (92 basis points) less likely to reject an AfricanAmerican or Hispanic loan applicant for reasons unrelated to observable life-cycle covariates.”192 In addition, with respect to pricing of
loans, after controlling for observable differences, they found AfricanAmerican and Hispanic borrowers “pay [traditional lenders] a slightly
(0.08%) higher interest rate for purchase mortgages and about 0.03%
higher mortgage interest rate for refinance mortgages.”193 They note,
however, that “[t]hese differences are less pronounced among refi
lenders who utilize algorithmic underwriting, for whom the differential

Askins, supra note 26, at 2–3 (stating that “objective lending technology
reduces the perceived bias in funding loans).
187
Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 9 (“They have developed
unorthodox underwriting approaches using automation and algorithms that are
often opaque. These algorithms pose possible disparate impacts if they
implement seemingly objective criteria that nevertheless result in disproportionately rejecting applications of credit for minorities, women, or other
protected classes.”).
188
See generally Robert P. Bartlett et al., Consumer Lending Discrimination
in the FinTech Era (UC Berkley Pub. L. Res. Paper, 2017), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3063448. (examining Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data
provided by Dataquick, McDash, and Equifax).
189
Id. at 3.
190
Id. at 1.
191
Id. at 24; see also id. at 18 (detailing the unexplained discriminatory rates
of large and small fintechs).]
192
Id. at 18.
193
Id. at 24.
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is only 0.01%.”194 In other words, fintech lending decreases the risk of
fair lending violations, both for loan approval and fair pricing.
E.

Loan Portfolio Performance: Default and
Delinquency Benefit/Risk

Expectations concerning risks of default pertaining to loans
underwritten by fintech lenders was largely voiced as a word of
caution; i.e., they related to the uncertainty regarding loan performance
for loans underwritten based on new models (and particularly in the
event of an economic downturn).195 While such a downturn has not yet
occurred, the current market, fintech lenders have experienced lower
default rates than traditional lenders.196
Fuster, Plosser, Vickery & Schnabe examined fintech lenders
in the mortgage market.197 They examined U.S. mortgages originated
from 2010 to 2016, and studied default rates on FHA loans, and found
that “loans originated by FinTech lenders are 35% less likely to default
than comparable loans originated by non-FinTech lenders.”198 Balyuk
examined default rates in consumer loans.199 She examined data on
loans made by Prosper Marketplace, one of the largest peer-to-peer
lenders in the United States, in the period between 2011 and 2015.200
She found total debt of borrowers who receive peer-to-peer loans was
3.6% higher than those whose loans were rejected.201 However, the
194

Id. (“These differences are less pronounced among refi lenders who utilize
algorithmic underwriting, for whom the differential is only 0.01%.”).
195
See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1–2.
196
Id. at 2–3 (“We find that default rates on FinTech mortgages are about
25% lower than those for traditional lenders, even when controlling for
detailed loan characteristics.”).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 16 (“[W]e find that loans originated by FinTech lenders are 35% less
likely to default than comparable loans originated by non-FinTech lenders.”).
Default rates were calculated based on loans that were at least ninety days
delinquent or were subject to an FHA insurance claim. The results were the
same for a one-year and two-year default rate, and “quantitatively similar . . .
when considering home purchase loans or refinances separately,” as well as
for loans to underserved communities. Id.
199
Tetyana Balyuk, Financial Innovation and Borrowers: Evidence from
Peer-to-Peer Lending (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2802220,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802220.
200
See generally id.
201
Id. at 37.
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higher total debt does not lead to higher delinquency rates.202 This
result is consistent with a study by TransUnion Credit Bureau of over
forty million personal loans that originated between 2014 and 2016.203
The study found that fintech lenders have delinquency rates higher
than other lenders in the subprime risk tier;204 this tier accounts for ten
percent of fintech balances.205 It noted that “looking at the near prime
risk tier, FinTech delinquencies drop below traditional lender delinquencies. For prime risk tiers, delinquency rates for all lenders begin to
converge,” and, moving up the credit spectrum, become “almost indistinguishable.”206
In the economic climate of recent years, the underwriting
model used by fintech lenders has not resulted in higher default/
delinquency in loans.207 Indeed, in the consumer loan and mortgage
markets, rates of delinquency are lower for fintech lenders.208 However, this still leaves open the question of how these loans will fare in
the event of an economic downturn or recession.
F.

Lack of Transparency Risk

The expected risk of lack of transparency was a concern in
OCC Public Comments both for the borrower and the investors
funding fintech lending.209 Studies of transparency to date have largely
focused only on the small business borrower.210 Are terms and rates
clearly disclosed to applicants and borrowers? Two studies of market
practices both signal there may be some cause for concern, although
concern also exists with respect to transparency at large banking
institutions.211
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See e.g., 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117.
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See 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL
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The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey collected information
from businesses in twenty-six states.212 Part of the survey involved
satisfaction with the application process,213 and respondents reported
nearly equal levels of dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency at
both large banks and online lenders.214 Lack of transparency was a
reason for dissatisfaction among 33% of successful applicants at large
banks, 32% at online lenders, and 22% at small banks.215
The survey was repeated in 2016 with information collected
from small businesses in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.216
Respondents reported similar results with respect to applicants’
dissatisfaction due to lack of transparency.217 Forty-nine percent of
applicants cited lack of transparency as their primary reason for
dissatisfaction with online lenders, compared to 48% with large banks,
and 47% with small banks.218
The survey was repeated again in 2017 with information from
small businesses in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.219 This
survey yielded similar results, although the overall frequency of dissatisfaction due to lack of transparency in the application process
declined.220 Specifically, the survey found 15% of applicants dissatisfied with online lenders for lack of transparency, compared with 14%
at large banks, and 9% at small banks.221
Each survey was slightly different, both in terms of number
and distribution of respondents and in terms of method of reporting.222
The 2015 survey reported dissatisfaction among successful appli212

2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at iii.
Id. at 14.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 14.
216
2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at iii.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 17.
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2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at iii.
220
Id. at 14.
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2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at 14 (showing that
“borrower satisfaction is consistently highest with CDFIs, credit unions, and
small banks, but satisfaction with online lenders has increased.”).
222
Compare 2015 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 117 at 14
(finding that successful applicants were not satisfied), and 2016 Small
Business Credit Survey, supra note 83, at 14 (focusing on the reason for
applicants’ lack of satisfaction with their primary lender), with 2017 Small
Business Credit Survey, supra note 94, at 18 (including responses from
applicants but not targeting the primary reason for dissatisfaction).”
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cants.223 The 2016 survey reported dissatisfaction among all applicants
and also focused on the primary reason for dissatisfaction with the
particular lender.224 The 2017 survey also included responses from all
applicants but it did not target the primary reason for dissatisfaction
with the particular applicant.225 Thus, the most useful information lies
in the comparison of lenders in each survey. Small businesses reported
they are equally dissatisfied with lack of transparency at both online
lenders and large banks.226 Further research is required to examine
market outcomes with respect to the expected benefit or risk to customer privacy and data security, or the expected risk of lack of sufficient
transparency for investors.
III.

Policy Implications and Conclusion

The overriding issue when considering regulatory or legislative intervention is whether market choices can be relied upon to
deliver the benefits of fintech lending and to address its risks. This is
especially important in the fintech industry that has introduced many
innovations in a lightly regulated environment.
In OCC Public Comments the expected benefit of fintech
lending most frequently recited was increased access to credit.227 It
was an expected benefit identified in the Treasury Department and
GAO surveys as well.228 Overall, market outcomes largely confirm
delivery of this benefit in the consumer loan market and small business
market.229 Increased access was provided through removal of geographic barriers to credit and through availability of smaller loans.230 It
was also available through increased access for younger firms, smaller
firms, and minority-owned firms.231 However, the evidence is divided
as to whether consumers with credit challenges under traditional
criteria for creditworthiness experienced increased access to credit in
223
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either the consumer loan market or mortgage market.232 Moreover, it is
unlikely that fintech lending has increased access to credit among the
unbanked.233
Market outcomes also confirm the expected benefits of faster
and more convenient access to credit.234 However, the evidence is
divided on the expected benefit of lower costs to borrowers.235 Market
outcomes evidence high interest rates in some markets, and even
usurious or predatory terms in some cases.236 In other words, market
risk, rather than market benefit, was actually in evidence.
Market outcomes also confirmed the expected risk of lack of
transparency in loan terms and pricing in the small business loan market.237 However, two expected risks have not surfaced. One is a
heightened risk of default due to nontraditional methods of credit
assessment.238 The other is the risk of fair lending violations.239 Indeed,
the evidence suggests that automated credit underwriting procedure
performed by fintech firms has decreased the risk of biased outcomes.240 Those outcomes signal a need to embrace regulatory or
legislative initiatives that control excessive interest rates and fees,
which in turn require transparency, especially in the small business
loan market.241 Nonetheless, the outcomes to date generally do not
require greater financial inclusion on the part of fintech lenders,
except, perhaps, in the mortgage loan market and technological literacy initiatives for the unbanked.242 The outcomes to date also do not
signal a need to address the risk of loan defaults through substantial
232
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capital requirements.243 The caveat is that fintech lenders’ underwriting procedure has not been tested in an economic downturn.
On July 31, 2018 the OCC announced it will begin to accept
applications for SPNB Charters for Fintech Companies.244 This followed the Department of the Treasury’s endorsement of such a charter.245 What regulatory requirements should such a charter impose to
address risks and benefits of fintech lending identified in this article?
The Licensing Manual for charter applications from fintech companies, issued July 31, 2018, makes no mention of transparency
requirements,246 nor does the OCC Policy Statement on Financial
Technology Companies.247 This is understandable in that the risk of
lack of transparency for borrowers is a risk identified in the small
business loan market.248 The Truth-in-Lending Act requires transparency in consumer loans, but its reach does not extend to small business
loans.249 This is a matter, therefore, that the Comptroller cannot
address by regulation, but requires legislative action.
243

See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS
FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (July 2018), https://www.occ.
treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/pubconsidering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-co.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L55-N6JY]
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Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/C32XYs92].
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Nonbank Financials, supra note 3, at 10 (“At the federal level, Treasury
encourages the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to further develop
its special purpose national bank charter. . . .”).
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Licensing Manual Supplement, supra note 243.
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Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply for National Bank Charters (Jul.
31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/otherpublications-reports/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf
[https://perman.cc/ARV2-2J46] [hereinafter Policy Statement on Eligibility]
(omitting any transparency requirement for fintech’s eligibility to apply for a
national bank charter).
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See supra notes 213–21 and accompanying text.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), 1603(1) (2012) (outlining the focus of the TILA on
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The benefit of increased access to credit and the risk of
excessive or predatory rates and fees are briefly mentioned in the
Comptroller’s newly issued Policy Statement and Licensing Manual
Supplement.250 The Policy Statement addresses access in its discussion
of financial inclusion, in these terms:
The OCC . . . expects a fintech company that receives
a national bank charter to demonstrate a commitment
to financial inclusion. The nature of that commitment
will depend on the company’s business model and the
types of products, services, and activities it plans to
provide. By providing a high standard similar to the
Community Reinvestment Act’s expectations for
national banks that take insured deposits, the financial
inclusion commitment will help ensure that all
national banks provide fair access to financial services and treat customers fairly.251
The market outcomes discussed in Part II of this article
indicate market forces are already generating many forms of increased
access to credit in the consumer personal loan market and the small
business loan market. The mortgage market, however, has not clearly
realized this benefit. Moreover, the evidence is divided as to whether
credit-challenged borrowers under traditional underwriting criteria
experience greater access in the fintech loan market. Some of the OCC
Public Comments raised questions concerning the OCC’s power to
impose a financial inclusion requirement for licensing252 That issue is
beyond the scope of this article. However, financial inclusion obligations in the mortgage market do arise from the Community ReinvestTILA is not applicable to extensions of credit primarily for business,
commercial or agricultural purposes).
250
Licensing Manual Supplement, supra note 243, at 18 (describing how,
prior to approval, the OCC will review the extent to which the SPNB will help
meet the credit needs of underserved populations); Policy Statement on
Eligibility, supra note 247, at 4.
251
Policy Statement on Eligibility, supra note 247, at 3. See also Licensing
Manual Supplement, supra note 243, at 17–18.
252
Brian R. Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier,
20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 191 (2017). (arguing for further regulation
in relation to expanding or modifying the Community Reinvestment Act). See
generally OCC Public Comments, supra note 21 (describing the public’s
reaction to proposed OCC changes).
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ment Act.253 That statute applies to “regulated financial institutions”,
defined as “an insured depository institution (as defined in section
1813 of this title . . .”254 The Act does not apply to financial institutions
that do not receive insured deposits, and therefore does not apply to
current fintech lenders absent legislative action.255
Finally, with regard to the risk of excessive rates, fees, and
other predatory lending issues, the OCC’s Policy Statement merely
mentions that in providing a charter the OCC “will consider whether a
proposed [fintech] bank . . . will provide fair access to financial
services, will treat customers fairly, and will comply with the applicable laws and regulations.”256 However, it also warns that “proposals
that include financial products and services that have predatory, unfair,
or deceptive features or that pose undue risk to consumer protection,
would be inconsistent with law and policy and would not be
approved.”257
Some of the OCC Public Comments pointed out that a
national charter might exacerbate the risk of excessive interest rates
and predatory lending by preempting state laws.258 The scope of
federal preemption of state law is beyond the reach of this article.
However, in light of the evidence of excessive rates and predatory
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Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining that because fintech
companies with national charters may not be subject to state consumer
protection laws, such charters may make predatory lending practices more
rampant); Letter from Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of
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preemption of state consumer protection laws provided to fintech companies
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note 21 (listing various public letters written to OCC providing opinions and
commentary on the OCC’s proposal to provide a national charter option to
fintech companies)
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terms found in Part II of this article, the possible heightened risk of
predatory lending is an issue that requires close scrutiny.259
The issue of risk management and capital requirements is
addressed in the OCC Licensing Manual Supplement for fintech
companies.260 After stating fintech banks with a national charter will
be subject to the minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements that apply to all national banks, the Licensing Manual highlights
risks posed by nontraditional strategies.261 The OCC then states that
“organizers should propose minimum capital levels the bank will
adhere to after profitability that would be appropriate for” the risks
associated with the applicant’s business plan, including “volatility
specific to a business line.”262 The market outcomes to date on default
and delinquency suggest a low level of risk from fintech lending,
indicating that there is no need for significantly greater capital requirements.263 However, there are two words of caution in embracing this
conclusion. First, fintech lenders’ nontraditional underwriting practices
have created loans that have not faced an economic downturn.264
Second, the Opportunity Fund’s study highlights that some fintech
lenders are making loans with terms that are not sustainable .265
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Seeking an SPNB charter is merely an option for a fintech
lender.266 If fintech lenders chose not to obtain such a charter, the risks
identified in this article must be addressed under other, existing federal
or state laws and regulatory requirements. Whether such laws and
requirements are up to the task of minimizing the risks of predatory
lending and potential default risks while maximizing the benefit of
increased access to credit, are issues to be explored as fintech lending
quickly emerges.

266

Press Release, supra note 244, at 2 (“A national bank charter is only one
option among many for companies engaged in the business of banking.”).

